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Abstract 
Under the current proposals, the EU development cooperation budget would increase 
by 30%. This paper explores how this potential increase is designed to assist the EU in 
consolidating its international identity in line with the aims of the Global Strategy 
(EUGS) by better aligning the money in the development budget to the global ambitions 
of the EU. This has reignited concerns that this represents further politicisation of the 
development activities of the EU beyond the Treaty commitment to poverty reduction 
and once again highlights the tension between development goals and broader strategic 
goals. This paper explores this tension between development and strategic goals in 
what is clearly a moving target area. Comparing how the vision for EU development 
policy has evolved between the 2006 and 2017 Consensus’ on Development provides 
the context for a comparison to broader vision for external action set out in the EU’s 
Global Strategy. The paper then explores the proposed budget reforms in light of this 
comparison highlighting the implications for the EU as a development actor. It shows 
how discussions around the size of the EU budget coincide with Brexit and the re-
negotiation of the EU’s relationship with a key group of developing countries, the ACP. 
It shows that the future negotiations will focus on the overall amount of the EU 
development budget, how the budget will be used and where – decisions that will shine 
a light onto the priorities of the EU as a development actor. 
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Introduction1  
The European Union (EU)’s draft Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) for 2021-
27 is currently under negotiation. If approved, the EU’s development cooperation 
budget would increase by 30% despite Brexit. The discussions around reforms to the 
budget are part of the realignment of foreign policy tools that assists the EU in con-
solidating its international identity in line with the aims of the Global Strategy (EUGS). 
Over the years we have seen a shift in the relationship between development and wider 
foreign policy concerns from a ‘comprehensive approach’ towards the ‘integrated 
approach’ set out in the EUGS (Faleg 2018). The ‘comprehensive approach’ started to 
ensure the EU operated in an increasingly complex foreign policy sphere in a more 
joined-up fashion, avoiding duplication and extra costs. The integrated approach takes 
this to the next level moving from process to a more systematic approach (see Faleg 
2018). Moving towards an integrated approach involves more than semantics, and so 
exploring how development cooperation is framed in the MFF will represent a litmus 
test for the concrete implementation of the EUGS as the EU aims to ‘distil a common 
vision into concrete plans’ (Di Ciommo et al. 2017; Venturi 2019).  
Development is clearly an area within which it is crucial that different actors and policy 
areas work in harmony with each other given the multi-faceted causes of poverty and 
under-development. This is complicated by the fact that development policy, like much 
of EU external action, is underpinned by norms (Orbie and Carbone 2016; Lightfoot 
and Kim 2018; Steingass 2019). The key to action thus far has been designing the most 
effective combination of policy tools to deploy in key theatres and sectors helping the 
EU become a more effective development actor (see Ehrhart and Petretto 2014: 180; 
Keijzer and Verschaeve 2018). The current plan is to follow this with a better alignment 
of the money in the development budget to the global ambitions of the EU. 
There is a concern that this would represent further politicisation of the development 
activities of the EU. For example, there is a treaty commitment to poverty reduction 
which some critics fear is vulnerable to broader strategic concerns, with the EUGS 
explicitly stating that ‘[d]evelopment policy also needs to become more flexible and 
aligned with our strategic priorities’ (EEAS 2016). The tension between development 
goals and broader strategic goals is a long-standing one in reforms of EU development 
cooperation (Carbone 2007).  
The aim of this paper is to explore this perceived tension between development and 
strategic goals in what is clearly a moving target area. After a brief appraisal of the 
                                                 
1 An earlier version of this paper was presented at the GLOBUS workshop ‘The EU’s trade and develop-
ment policies in a changing global environment’ on 14-15 March 2019. We would like to thank the 
GLOBUS project for the invitation to both attend the workshop and to publish this working paper. 
The paper builds upon ideas first surfaced in Hadfield and Lightfoot 2019. We would also like to 
thank Helene Sjursen, Johanne Døhlie Saltnes and Niels Keijzer for their comments on the earlier 
draft. Any errors remain our own.  
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objectives of EU development policy, the paper first compares two documents that set 
out the vision for EU development policy; the 2006 Consensus and the 2017 Consensus 
on Development. We identify any changes between the two documents and what this 
means for the EU’s future definition of and ambitions for development policy. Next, we 
compare the development goals of the EU with those set out in the EUGS and 
specifically the proposed reforms to the MFF. Finally, the paper will briefly explore the 
positions of the main actors (the Commission/EEAS, the Parliament and the member 
states) and offer some conclusions as to where the sources of agreement and tension 
will occur.  
EU Development Policy: Background 
In material terms, the EU is the world’s largest donor of Official Development Assistance 
(ODA), providing over 50 per cent of global ODA, equating to over €10 billion in 2016. 
The sheer reach of EU assistance as well as its increasingly focused nature in terms of 
tools and instruments effectively equips the Union with leverage to ‘use development 
cooperation to effect changes within third countries that parallel its world-view and 
foreign policy objectives’ (Keukeleire and Delreux 2014: 211). EU ODA is distributed 
both geographically, i.e. focused on specific countries or regions, and thematically. The 
themes reflect EU priorities and norms and cover issues such as gender equality (e.g. 
promoting good practices in public and private sectors in sub-Saharan states like 
Zambia to strengthen gender mainstreaming), human rights and improved good govern-
ance more broadly, as well as newer features like migration (e.g. via capacity-building 
programmes tackling migration in the Horn of Africa) (European Commission 2017). 
This discussion highlights once again that all EU external relations have normative 
dimensions (see Sjursen 2006 for a fuller discussion of the normative aspects of EU 
external policy).  
The Lisbon Treaty sets out that development policy is a shared parallel competence 
meaning that the member states maintain their own bilateral aid programmes along-
side the EU’s own long-standing multilateral development structure. It also states that 
EU development cooperation policy shall have as its primary objective the reduction 
and, in the long term, the eradication of poverty. Importantly, the Treaty sets out that 
the objectives of development cooperation need to be incorporated in other policies the 
EU implements which are likely to affect developing countries. The three principles that 
direct EU development policy are as follows: coherence of EU policy in and of itself (i.e. 
horizontal consistency); coordination between EU and its member states in facilitating 
non-duplicatory funding (i.e. vertical consistency), and complementarity between EU 
policies and programmes and those of its member states (i.e. intrinsic to the shared 
nature of the development competences) (see Orbie and Lightfoot 2017). The 
relationship between the member states and the EU as well as the relationships 
between the member states (see Krüger and Steingass 2019) are the key relationships 
in this policy sphere.  
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In terms of the priorities of EU development policies, it has historically focused on the 
ACP (African, Caribbean and Pacific) countries (largely former UK and French colonies). 
This relationship formed the backbone of EU development policy under the oversight 
of DG Development. The most recent treaty underpinning the relationship, the Cotonou 
Partnership Agreement, covers relations between the EU and 70 ACP states in the areas 
of trade, political dialogue, and the role of norms and principles as part of the con-
ditional aid framework. Cotonou has been both contentious in its negotiation and 
uneven in its implementation, with critics highlighting the asymmetrical nature of the 
relationship between the EU and the partner states (Bararinde 2019). The other key set 
of relationships within the field of development were with the Neighbourhood countries 
of North Africa and Eastern Europe under the oversight of the Directorate-General for 
European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations (DG NEAR). The geo-
graphical division in development policy has been identified as preventing effective 
action in the development policy space, in part because the money was also connected 
to different Commission DGs (as we will show later). These tensions were reinforced by 
the different competences ascribed to the Commission and the member states according 
to which legal area the issue falls under. The complexity meant that in 2005 the 
Commission and the member states came together to agree the European consensus on 
development, the aim of which was to try and improve the delivery of aid by the EU and 
the member states (Carbone 2007).  
A tale of two consensus(es): 2006-2017 
The 2006 European Consensus on Development was premised on tackling poverty, 
against the explicit backdrop of the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The 
objectives of the consensus was to ensure that both the EU institutions and the member 
states in their bilateral policies shared the same vision. The Consensus set out the pri-
mary goal of development policy as ‘the eradication of poverty in the context of sustain-
able development, including pursuit of the Millennium Development Goals’. Rather 
than identifying development as a means to a broader end (e.g. soft power or global 
influence), the Consensus argues that ‘development is a central goal by itself while 
sustainable development refers to a package that reforms both governments and com-
munities alike, including good governance, human rights and political, economic, social 
and environmental issues’ (European Commission 2006).  
Set against a backdrop of protracted turf wars between the EU and the ACP states in 
defining the ownership and management of development goals, the Consensus suggests 
that the EU will work both top-down with the UN and major funders, and bottom-up 
with beneficiaries themselves. Enhanced ‘policy coherence’ should therefore arise, with 
the EU taking greater account ‘of the objectives of development cooperation in all 
policies that it implements which are likely to affect developing countries, and that 
these policies support development objectives’. In 2006 the EU widened the criteria for 
eligibility for aid beyond solely low-income countries (LICs) to also include middle-
income countries (MICs) and consideration for regions which may yield more by way 
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of ‘comparative advantages and can add most value to the fight against poverty’. This 
shows that alongside the poverty reduction rhetoric, there was a growing connection 
between development policy and broader foreign policy concerns within the Consensus 
(see Carbone 2013; Henökl and Keijzer 2016).  
A decade later, in 2017, the European Consensus on Development was updated in light 
of a changed global environment, further linking development policy to broader strategic 
and foreign policy concerns. The major change is the placement of the 2017 Consensus 
as ‘the cornerstone of the EU’s development policy’. Development also forms the centre-
piece for the EU’s Global Europe Strategy, including both its 2030 Agenda (covering 
sustainable development) and the 2016 Global Strategy (covering external action more 
broadly).  
In stating that ‘EU development policy also pursues the objectives of EU external 
action’, laudably defined in development terms by the Lisbon Treaty, the 2017 Consensus 
is arguably a far clearer tool for EU external action than its predecessor. Consistency 
between all elements of external action requires coherent narrative engagement between 
the EU and its designated aid recipients, ensuring its own ‘credibility, legitimacy, 
accountability, added value, influence and a positive impact on the world’. This is surely 
a valuable objective, particularly set against the risks of duplication and overlap, but 
the approach also signals the increasing importance of the ‘optics’ of giving in which 
ODA not only has to be given for the right reasons but also yield progressive results in 
relation to the EU’s thematic approach to aid.  
Combining poverty eradication with a range of other goals, chiefly that of sustainable 
development, means that the 2017 Consensus is broader thematically and geographically. 
The 2017 document also makes clear that international objectives ought also to reflect 
the EU’s headline policies at home. For instance, in terms of ‘the scale of financial 
investment needed to bring about universal access to safe and clean energy services’, 
the consensus states that ‘supporting Africa and the EU’s neighbourhood in this energy 
transition will be part of the enabling framework for the EU’s energy Union’ (European 
Commission 2017: 24; see also Kuzemko and Hadfield 2016).  
Migration is another good example. Not regarded as a key aspect of development in 
2006, migration is in 2017 a key theme regarded as intimately attached to poverty, 
political instability, social insecurity and a primary economic driver. Tackling migration 
requires not only a broader approach to overlapping challenges but also a more facili-
tative approach to ensuring partners’ cooperation. The 2017 Consensus provides a 
snapshot of ‘the changing approach to global development’ evident in the replacement 
of MDGs with SDGs (Sustainable Development Goals) and the 2030 Agenda. As such, 
sustainable development dominates as the overarching theme of the 2017 Consensus, 
reflecting a far wider approach to development in terms of long-term objectives, modes 
of implementation, methods of measurement, the preferred thematic vs. geographical 
balance to be struck, and identifiable bilateral and multilateral development partners 
(European Commission 2017).  
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The 2017 Consensus effectively locates development as the seminal policy for the global 
community, and the EU itself as a leading policy provider, heightening the commitment 
to global governance outlined in the 2016 Global Strategy, while clarifying the trinity of 
objectives that underpin that strategy: engagement, responsibility and partnership. 
The 2017 Consensus thus makes clear that the EU’s commitments, and their imple-
mentation, ‘must be founded on a rules-based global order, with multilateralism as its 
key principle and the United Nations at its core’ (European Commission 2017: 3). It is 
unclear whether the EU’s preferred position is to lead from the front, partner in 
complementary fashion with the UN, or lead on a few chosen initiatives rather than the 
full spectrum of development goals, although the actions of the new Commission 
President Ursula Von der Leyen suggest a willingness to lead. However, two factors 
require clarification first before the geography of global development can be more 
clearly mapped out: the renegotiation of the ACP-EU relationship (Carbone 2019) and 
the impact of Brexit upon both the budget and the shape and objectives of EU develop-
ment policy itself (Henökl 2017; Lightfoot et al. 2017). The fact that Brexit removes a 
vocal supporter of the ACP relationship at the same time as the Cotonou treaty comes 
up for re-negotiation may allow the EU the opportunity to reshape the objectives and 
reach of EU development policy, although core states such as France still wish to main-
tain the relationship (see Price 2016). Brexit is not the only contextual issue influencing 
EU development policy. The euro crisis and the rise of populist governments all work 
against development in that many governments wish to focus the limited spending at 
home (see Bodenstein et al. 2017; Beringer et al. 2019). Hence we need to explore 
whether the money in the EU budgets supports the EU’s external norms. 
Competing norms in EU development policy 
Saltnes (2019: 536) has argued that we may see ‘competing normative viewpoints on 
what an effective development policy post 2015 should entail’. A key area for com-
petition is likely to be around the language associated with the commitment to ‘poverty 
reduction’ within the Treaties. It is clear that this normative competition will be at the 
heart of post-2020 policy discussions. Allwood (2019) argues that development policy 
is increasingly framed with reference to other priorities such as migration, security and 
climate change and this forces other issues such a gender off the radar, with a concern 
that poverty reduction will soon follow.  
Poverty reduction has remained at the heart of EU development policy for many years 
moving from a focus on purely social and financial terms to more multifactorial ex-
planations of the various causes and effects of poverty. The 2017 Consensus represents 
the latter; this gives the EU room to manoeuvre in designating a whole host of problems 
as effectively contributory to poverty, but it is possibly too ambiguous a definition under-
stood as it is as ‘social uplift rather than purely through primary aid or fiscal stimulus’ 
(Interview, EU Official, Brussels, 5th May 2018). When the EUGS mentions the MFF, 
it refers explicitly to two areas of intervention: defence and development. When it comes 
to development, the EUGS states: ‘Development policy will become more flexible and 
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aligned with our strategic priorities’ (EEAS 2016). The EUGS does reaffirm the col-
lective commitment to achieve the 0.70 per cent target, although the EU collective ODA 
represented only 0.50 per cent in 2017. When the EUGS calls for development policies 
that are ‘flexible and aligned with our strategic priorities’, it mainly refers to streng-
thening their connections with other fields, such as migration and security.  
The 2017 Consensus focuses on the ‘quality and effectiveness’ of the aid that the EU can 
provide, across rather more ambiguously defined areas such as good governance. 
Accordingly, the Comprehensive Approach that underpins foreign economic policies is 
plainly the preferred approach: ‘when planning and implementing development co-
operation, the EU and its Member States will pay particular attention to such inter-
linkages and to integrated actions that can create co-benefits and meet multiple objectives 
in a coherent way’ (European Commission 2017: 8). The EUGS contains five vague 
commitments to poverty reduction through statements such as tackling the ‘root causes 
of conflict and poverty’ or allowing ‘ever more people to escape poverty and live longer 
and freer lives’ or ‘we will fight poverty and inequality’. However, it does have a clear 
vision to deliver ‘prosperity’ via statements such as ‘development funds should catalyse 
strategic investments through public-private partnerships, driving sustainable growth, 
job creation, and skills and technological transfers’ (see EEAS 2016). This will simplify 
the Commission’s external spending in line with the aim of the 2017 Development Con-
sensus to provide ‘simplification, and targeted and cooperative development’ (European 
Commission 2017). The consensus sets development as the soft power centrepiece for 
the EU’s Global Europe strategy, even going so far as to argue that it – as a strategy – 
will ‘contribute to the requirement of ensuring consistency between the different areas 
of EU external action, and between these areas and its other policies’ (European 
Commission 2017). In turn, the MFF 2021-27 includes a proposal for a comprehensive 
financial instrument, which the European Commission sees as a main implementing 
tool for the consensus.  
Insights from the new MFF into norm debates? 2 
Under the current MFF (2014 to 2020) the two key funding instruments reflect a geo-
graphic divide within EU external action. The European Development Fund (EDF) is 
the main funding source for ACP states, but this sits outside the formal EU frameworks, 
financed by direct contributions from all EU member states and covered by its own 
financial rules. The Development Cooperation Instrument is within the EU framework 
and covers programmes in Latin America, South Asia, North and South East Asia, Central 
Asia, Middle East and South Africa. The proposed re-organisation of the MFF is around 
four strategic Headings with the Commission’s plan to create a single instrument under 
Heading 4 called ‘the neighbourhood and international cooperation instrument’, which 
will pool the resources of existing separate instruments, such as the European 
                                                 
2 See Castillejo et al. (2018a) for an excellent overview of the prospects and challenges for EU 
development cooperation in the new MFF.  
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Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI), European Development Fund (EDF), Development 
Cooperation Instrument (DCI), and European Initiative on Democracy and Human 
Rights (EIHDR) (European Commission 2018).  
The Commission argument is that this will simplify external spending, avoid duplication 
and offer more flexibility, while maintaining that ‘poverty eradication remains the 
broad focus’ and that ‘the policies remain the same’ (Castillejo et al. 2018b: 56). The 
proposal will also increase the amount of money available for external action, with one 
commentator arguing that ‘development cooperation has emerged a winner’ (Gavas 
2018). Gavas argues that  
at first glance, things are looking up for EU development spending with a pro-
posed 26 percent increase from €97 billion (including the off-budget European 
Development Fund controlled by member states) to €123 billion over the seven-
year period, and an increased share of the EU budget from 6 percent to 10 
percent. All this without the UK’s current annual contribution of €1.4 billion to 
EU development spending. The increase comes from a variety of measures, 
including the scrapping of budget rebates and a reduction in agricultural 
subsidies and cohesion funds.  
(Gavas 2018)  
Within the overall budget, the new proposals see a 43 per cent increase in funding for 
the European Neighbourhood from €15bn to €22bn, funding that is ‘ring fenced over 
the seven-year period’. This is a clear geographic indication of where the EU’s interests 
lie in regards to targeted development. There is also a plan to increase funding to Sub-
Saharan Africa by 23 per cent, with one of the factors behind this increase likely to be 
the EU’s desire to tackle migration at the source, rather than respond to migration 
crises when they occur (Gavas 2018).  
CONCORD (2018), a European NGO confederation for relief and development, agree 
that the proposals have a series of advantages, as they represent an opportunity to 
simplify the current architecture and to avoid duplication as well as ensuring greater 
coherence and complementarity between instruments. Given the possible political 
sensitivities around these discussions, the most recent peer review of the EU’s plans by 
the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) did not swerve the issue and 
made a number of recommendations relating to the political context of the MFF 
negotiations. The peer review was carried out by development experts from Canada and 
Japan and is the standard OECD DAC method of reviewing the development co-
operation of the DAC members. Their recommendations are a form of soft law and as 
such have political rather than legal weight. Of the many recommendations within the 
peer review, a major concern relates to the proposed changes to the development 
budget and their implications for the future of development cooperation, especially in 
light of the 2017 European Consensus on Development. The DAC review team saw a 
lack of operational guidance on how the 2017 Consensus’s focus on poverty reduction 
and sustainable development will actually be kept up in light of the MFF negotiations. 
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Such guidance, however, might be necessary to clarify ‘how EU actors and member states 
will work coherently, particularly in focusing on the poorest countries and leaving no 
one behind’ (OECD DAC 2018). This passage in the peer review chimes with criticisms 
that the EU’s focus on security and migration would undermine its focus on partner 
countries’ long-term development needs, particularly by increasingly designing develop-
ment cooperation programmes with their impact on security and or migration in mind 
(Allwood 2019; Cardwell and Jančić 2019).  
There is a concern that the one-pot-for-all approach would impact negatively on some 
key transversal issues like gender equality (see Allwood 2019). CONCORD (2018) is 
concerned that this proposal will not allow the EU to live up to its commitments on 
poverty eradication and sustainable development. In particular, they are concerned 
that issues like human rights or gender will no longer receive the attention and visibility 
they deserve and will be relegated as secondary priorities in a large instrument focused 
on forging partnerships with neighbouring and other countries to tackle EU migration, 
security and economic challenges (Allwood 2019). Even the name change is significant 
with Global Europe now becoming ‘The Neighbourhood and the World’, which leads to 
a sense of giving prominence to promoting security, stability and development in the 
EU’s neighbourhood. This is a clear geographical expression of where the EU sees its 
real added value (Gavas 2018). There is a lack of clarity on the criteria for allocation of 
funds, which has prompted concerns that aid could be diverted towards the promotion 
of Development Finance Institutions (DFIs) and private investments. Budgetisation of 
the EDF has long been supported by the European Parliament and it is felt that this 
step would be an important one in the continued democratic oversight of EU develop-
ment policy and the broader foreign policy (see Cardwell and Jančić 2019).  
With this focus on the neighbourhood, there is also a fear that integrating the EDF into 
a single instrument will weaken the EU’s relationship with the ACP states, especially 
the low-income countries. A large value share of EU ODA already goes to middle income 
countries in the EU’s neighbourhood. From 2014-2016, the EU’s top recipients of aid 
were Turkey, Morocco, Serbia and Tunisia, with internal member state interests guiding 
the allocation of funds (CONCORD 2018). By moving the EDF into the budget, given 
the primacy given to the EU’s neighbourhood, there is a real risk of weakening not only 
the financial commitment towards the ACP countries, but also their privileged relation-
ship with the EU (Gavas 2018). A specific concern is that once inside the budget, funds 
for the ACP states will become less visible and that the group will need to fight for 
resources. According to the peer review,  
the risk of subordinating development objectives to broader security and 
migration concerns, then, remains a key challenge for the EU, as it does for other 
DAC members. In the EU’s case, this challenge might be exacerbated by the pro-
posed streamlining of instruments in the upcoming MFF if appropriate safe-
guards are not included.  
(OECD DAC 2018) 
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Saltnes is worth quoting at length on this:  
The Commission’s proposal to budgetise the EDF rests primarily on pragmatic 
arguments about efficiency and coherence. However, streamlining all EU develop-
ment funds could harm long-term efforts to build a partnership with its counter-
parts in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific. […] The ACP group has been an 
important critic of the budgetisation proposal. In a statement published on 30 
May, the group stated that they were ‘strongly in favour of maintaining the 
European Development Fund (EDF) as the main financial instrument in support 
of ACP-EU development cooperation’. They noted that ‘one of its unique features 
is the fact that it is managed outside of the general EU budget’ and that ‘the EDF 
has fostered a particular culture that has made the ACP-EU partnership a unique 
development cooperation model’.  
(Saltnes 2018, quoting ACP Group 2018) 
Beyond the MFF, the DAC peer review highlights that the EU has shown leadership in 
its efforts towards reaching global agreements on sustainable development and climate 
change. It also praised its extensive use of budget support and variety of delivery instru-
ments, which it notes enhances ownership and inclusiveness in partner countries. Finally, 
the review praised the joined efforts to build global citizenship across Europe. However, 
without the external affairs budget reflecting the wider policy priorities of development 
cooperation these positives may not be enough for the EU to maintain its position as 
an effective development actor. 
There is likely to be very real competition between institutions and member states 
about the appropriate policy areas in which to make Global Europe truly effective. 
Member states vary in their geographical focus with a group including Denmark, France, 
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain tending to focus on Africa whilst others 
including Hungary, Poland, Finland and the Czech Republic are concerned about lack 
of funds for the Eastern Neighbourhood (Fallon 2019). There is also potential for 
further ‘turf wars’ between the Commission and the EEAS over development spending 
and even some possible tensions between the Commission’s desire for flexibility and 
the European Parliament’s desire for oversight which may prefer that funds be divided 
more transparently (European Parliamentary Research Service 2018; Cardwell and 
Jančić 2019). Interviews with Brussels-based decision-makers provide additional detail, 
a clear theme of which is the ‘concern about duplication between the Global Europe’s 
separate financial instruments’, the ‘limited scope within external action for dealing 
with crises, particularly in partner countries’, as well as ‘much greater clarity about the 
actual purpose of the EU’s thematic and geographic instruments’ in terms of improved 
development delivery (Interviews, Brussels, European Commission DG DEVCO, 4-6th 
May 2018). Key concerns highlighted by a development think tank include the budget’s 
lack of flexibility in dealing with shocks or crises (including migratory pressures, security 
threats such as terrorist attacks, and climate change-induced events), as well as the 
need to make funds work better within its proximate and still volatile neighbourhood, 
while demonstrating astute investment internationally (Sherriff 2019). Brexit, of course, 
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is likely to create further uncertainty, affecting as it does both the size and likely distri-
bution of the budget.  
Criticisms that the proposed budget plans signal a shift away from poverty to more 
strategic concerns have been countered in a reply to a blog post (Hadfield and Lightfoot 
2019) by a respondent from the EEAS. He argued that  
speculative concerns are difficult to address except through legal guarantees and 
effective action. The action will come later, during the programming and 
implementation phases of the 2021-27 budget, but the newly proposed legal 
framework under the NDICI (Neighbourhood, Development and International 
Cooperation Instrument) should already give some reassurances on top of the 
efficiency gains resulting from simplification and increased flexibility. 
(van Damme 2019)  
Further, he argued that this is done by the NDICI explicitly repeating the 2017 European 
Consensus on Development commitment to put ‘the 2030 agenda and the SDGs at the 
heart of its development policy’ along with ‘minimal DACability of 92%; minimal safe-
guarded allocation to Sub-Saharan Africa where a majority of LICs […] are con-
centrated; minimal thematic allocations: 25% to meet climate objectives, 20% for social 
inclusion and human development’. There is also a pushback on security and migration 
with the argument being made that with an emphasis on  
the root-causes of conflicts, irregular migration and forced displacement [which 
are] development and governance-related. The consolidation and support to 
democracy, rule of law and human rights therefore very explicitly remain over-
arching specific objectives of the new instrument in line with the Treaty objectives. 
There is also an argument that  
[w]ith the safeguards built into the legal framework, there is no reason to think 
that the ‘streamlining of instruments’ will exacerbate the perceived risks of sub-
ordination of the development objectives to broader external policy concerns 
which would undermine the achievement of those objectives and the achieve-
ment of the SDGs’.  
(van Damme 2019)  
Van Damme argues that ‘the initial exchanges with the EU Member States and the 
European Parliament confirm the shared development focus and above guarantees are 
definitely not expected to be weakened during the final negotiations of the instrument, 
rather on the contrary’. In contrast, the ETTG argues  
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that it is not clear whether the ambitious amount of the budget or the new single 
instrument will survive the negotiations. Financial resources for EU external 
action will, in large part, be determined by battles over other elements of the 
budget, notably agriculture and regional policy, as they have in the past. And the 
single instrument has yet to gain support from key Member States (MS) such as 
France and Poland. 
(Castillejo et al. 2018a; this paper also provides an overview of all 28 member 
states positions for MFF)  
Within the EU institutions there are key voices calling for the protection of the poverty 
reduction focus: Udo Bullman from the EP development committee sets out the broad 
EP position:  
We want to preserve the autonomy of development policy – and to this end the 
European Treaties set poverty reduction as the primary objective. In order to 
pursue the Agenda 2030 consistently, however, we must also work even more 
intensively on interlinking trade, foreign and climate policy issues – to name 
just a few areas. This must not, however, mean that development cooperation 
becomes an appendix to other policy areas. It’s important to prevent the instru-
mentalisation of development cooperation to safeguard European security 
interests and to restrict it to questions of migration management, for example.  
(Bullman 2019) 
Jutta Urpilainen, the commissioner elect for international partnerships, received a rela-
tively easy ride during the confirmation process – according to one report it was ‘smooth 
sailing’ for her. The hearing gave some insight into the priorities going forward with the 
questions focused on security and migration, the role of the EP, relations with Africa 
and the role of the private sector. The most significant change is the replacement of the 
‘Development’ Commissioner with a Commissioner for ‘International Partnerships’, 
and it is unclear whether this marks a rhetorical or substantive change, although it has 
been noted that the new title is less neo-colonial sounding (see Delputte et al. 2019). 
Also of note is the fact that the new Commission President’s first international trip was 
to Africa. In doing so, von der Leyen is clearly setting out the geopolitical priorities for 
the new Commission. 
Conclusion 
EU development policy is increasingly ‘situated between the bloc’s normative ideals 
and global geopolitical realities within which it is embedded’ (Beringer et al. 2019). So 
on the one hand we have this type of call:  
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The way forward is to promote a strong EU development policy that is not sub-
ordinated to other strategic interests of the EU but is adamant when it comes to 
a few key principles. This relates to the long-term and multi-dimensional nature 
of sustainable development, the adherence to fundamental values as well as to 
key principles of aid effectiveness, and implies a move away from the EU’s current 
damage control mode.  
(Koch et al. 2018) 
On the other we see a vision set out in von der Leyen’s mission letter which appears to 
suggest that ‘development’ objectives are subordinated to European interests. The letter 
also argues that the EU expects ‘value for money’, that ‘political, economic and invest-
ment opportunities in Africa’ should be pursued, and that the EU should leverage aid 
for private investment. It also sets out an ambition of a ‘geopolitical commission’: the 
focus on ‘countries of migration origin and transit’, and the task to ‘adapt bilateral fund-
ing to achieve our objectives on migration management’ give an extra push to the 
instrumentalisation of EU aid for geopolitical and migration management purposes 
(Delputte et al. 2019). 
The MFF debates will highlight these tensions over the coming months. As Venturi 
argues:  
clearly, the MFF is not an easy test for EUGS implementation due to its com-
plexity and to the need to balance domestic and foreign objectives. However, the 
EUGS has been internalized by the MFF debate, and it represents the document 
that will have, along with the Agenda 2030, the greatest impact on how the EU 
shapes external action policies under the new budget ceiling. Overall, it seems 
that the new MFF architecture can support the ambition of the EUGS. 
Additionally, the dedicated resources to external actions are slightly increased, 
notwithstanding the current budgetary difficulties related to Brexit. How develop-
ment cooperation will be framed in the MFF will represent a test for the concrete 
implementation of the EUGS. The coming months will show whether this level 
of commitment can be maintained in the final MFF.  
(Venturi 2019)  
The complications though are myriad. Work undertaken by the Gavas (2018) suggests 
that a trinity of decisions need to be taken sequentially to intelligently gather together 
the implications for MFF size and use, the preferred post-Cotonou framework, and 
available UK development cooperation. These include deciding what the overall 
amount for EU development budget will be, how the budget will be used and how it will 
be managed (Gavas 2018). The various pressures on the Commission, from Brexit to 
the migration challenge, are contributing to the ‘inward looking agenda’ of the EU 
(Beringer et al 2019). Hence, we see an increased spotlight on how and where develop-
ment funds are spent and by whom (Koch et al. 2018). Given the current political 
climate within the EU, Gavas’s slightly sombre conclusion that the odds are stacked 
against the development-focused aspects of the MFF and the EUGS therefore appears 
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to be the most realistic at present. The forces for development appear to be losing the 
battle for the normative direction of the EU’s external policy to those who wish to see 
development supporting the strategic goals of the Union.  
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